La struttura delle preferenze nel coordinamento delle politiche economiche: un caso a cambi fissi - The Role of the Preference Structure in the Coordination of Economic Policies: A Fixed Exchange Rate Case

The growing degree of interdependence between the EEC member countries which arises from the process of market unification, implies a reduction of the autonomy of national policy makers in pursuing their economic policy targets and the presence of conflicts between national objectives. A number of studies focus on the achievement of economic policy coordination as a means of overcoming these problems within a strategies game theoretical framework. One of the crucial results implied by these studies is treat the preference structure of the policy makers with respect to their targets is important in determining the outcome of the game. This paper focuses on this aspect of the problem and provides an explicit analytical demonstration of the two country model originality proposed by Hamada (1976). This model, set in a static framework, shows clearly the importance of the preferences of each government f or the definition of its economic policy strategy. The paper concludes by providing some critical considerations of the main features on this literature.