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¿Cuánto vale desertar?


  • María del Pilar Castillo

    () (Universidad del Valle)

  • Boris Salazar

    () (Universidad del Valle)


Members of an illegal armed organization reveal their desertion minimum values in reaction to the incentives offered by a government. Depending on the organization’s network structure, the desertion of an individual member will unleash a contagion process that will destroy the local network at a varying speed. Staging a game between a government and the members of an illegal organization, connected through a network structure, we show that the speed of the desertion process depends on the network structure and on its members’ minimum desertion values.

Suggested Citation

  • María del Pilar Castillo & Boris Salazar, 2009. "¿Cuánto vale desertar?," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 11(20), pages 199-227, January-J.
  • Handle: RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:11:y:2009:i:20:p:199-227

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Thomas McQuade & William Butos, 2005. "The Sensory Order and other Adaptive Classifying Systems," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 335-358, December.
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    More about this item


    social networks; desertion; game theory;

    JEL classification:

    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness


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