Constitutionalism under pressure: Evaluating the legal framework for a government of national unity in South Africa

The establishment of South Africa’s 2024 Government of National Unity (GNU) marks a significant departure from post-apartheid electoral norms, raising critical questions about the constitutional viability of coalition governance amid political fragmentation. This paper interrogates whether the existing constitutional framework adequately supports a GNU model under contemporary conditions of socio-economic strain and institutional fragility. Through a qualitative legal analysis of constitutional texts, key policy documents, political declarations, and jurisprudential trends, the study assesses how mechanisms such as separation of powers, executive authority, and intergovernmental cooperation are interpreted and deployed within unity arrangements. It traces the historical emergence of power-sharing in South Africa, comparing the 1994 transitional GNU to the current iteration, and identifies core challenges such as executive ambiguity, accountability erosion, and legal uncertainty. The paper further evaluates the role of civil society, the judiciary, and political culture in safeguarding constitutional order. By synthesizing insights from state performance, party behavior, and legal analysis, it identifies both limitations and reform opportunities within South Africa’s constitutional architecture. The study concludes with recommendations for strengthening democratic resilience through clearer legal design, institutional clarity, and enhanced civic engagement, contributing to global discourse on constitutional adaptability in emerging democracies. Key Words:Government of National Unity, Constitutional Accountability, Coalition Governance, South African Constitution, Legal Framework, Political Stability, Rule of Law