Constitutional coups and military interventions: Reassessing extended presidential tenure and its impact on governance in Africa

This paper critically examines the consolidation of executive power in Africa through constitutional amendments, often referred to as “constitutional coups,†and its correlation with the resurgence of military interventions. The study’s objective is to explore how the removal of presidential term limits, electoral law manipulation, and similar structural changes contribute to the erosion of democratic norms, institutional accountability, and political stability. Using a conceptual and theoretical analysis grounded in recent case studies, the paper demonstrates how these tactics entrench aging political elites and deepen systemic challenges such as corruption, poverty, and tribalism. It highlights how gerontocracy and ethnically skewed political appointments generate exclusionary governance structures that monopolize key institutions, including the judiciary, legislature, and the military, within dominant ethnic factions, thereby intensifying political marginalisation and social unrest. The paper argues that when peaceful mechanisms for political transition are closed off by such legal manipulations, the likelihood of mass protest and military coups increases. As a policy response, the study recommends the codification of African Union norms on constitutional amendment procedures, the enforcement of term limits, and the strengthening of continental early warning systems. These measures are vital for restoring institutional checks, deterring authoritarian entrenchment, and safeguarding democratic governance across the continent. The paper thus contributes to the discourse on constitutionalism and political accountability in Africa by offering practical, policy-relevant strategies for reform. Key Words:Extended Presidential Tenure, Constitutional Coups, Governance, Military Coups, Corruption, Social Fragmentation, Democratic Erosion, Africa, Civil Society, African Union