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Passata e futura regolamentazione per prevenire una crisi finanziaria sistemica

  • Mario Sarcinelli


    (Dexia Crediop, ABI)

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    Up to now, the G20 has supervised the process to revitalize the real economy affected by the Great Recession through fiscal stimuli and a very easy monetary policy, and to rescue the battered financial system by injecting capital into giant banks and firms. The G20 is now turning its attention to financial regulation, with the FSB as its main operational arm. The ideas that are being proposed stress the need for disincentives toward too much risk taking (more capital, higher liquidity, limits to remunerations and bonuses, etc.), particularly by big and complex financial institutions that are likely to entail systemic risks. The paper maintains that, as the disincentive approach is insufficient to deter financial managers looking for power, some kind of segmentation needs to be introduced, as suggested by Paul Volcker.

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    Article provided by Economia civile in its journal Moneta e Credito.

    Volume (Year): 63 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 249 ()
    Pages: 7-33

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    Handle: RePEc:psl:moneta:2010:2
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