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Le régime international pour le climat, vers la consolidation ou l'effondrement ?

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  • Pierre Berthaud
  • Denise Cavard
  • Patrick Criqui

Abstract

[fre] Pierre Berthaud Denise Cavard Patrick Criqui Le régime international pour le climat, vers la consolidation ou l'effondrement ? Cette contribution traite des modalités de gestion d'un problème d'action collective dans le domaine de la négociation sur le climat, en s'appuyant sur deux des concepts de l'Economie politique internationale (EPI), celui de régime international (RI), et celui d'hégémonie et/ou de leadership. Le cours suivi par la négociation internationale entre 1992 (convention de Rio) et mars 2001 (rejet par les Etats-Unis du protocole de Kyoto de 1997), conduit à s'interroger sur les conditions d'existence et la viabilité d'un régime international non hégémonique. On s'interroge ensuite sur les perspectives de l'après-Kyoto. L'examen des préférences des trois acteurs les plus actifs dans la négociation (Etats-Unis, Europe, G77+ Chine) combiné à celui des capacités de leadership qu'ils possèdent, permet de différencier trois scénarios d'avenir : i) l'anarchie, ii) un régime international sous hégémonie américaine, iii) un régime international sous leadership européen. [eng] The International Climate Regime, Towards Consolidation or Collapse? This article deals with the different modalities that exist to manage a problem of collective action in the field of climate negotiation. It uses two concepts of the International Political Economy (IPE) : the concept of International Regime (IR) and the concept of Hegemony and / or Leadership. The course the international negotiation has taken between 1992 (Rio Convention) and march 2001 (the US rejection of the Kyoto Protocol of 1997) leads us, first, to question the conditions of existence as well as the viability of a non-hegemonic International Regime. Then, we discuss the perspectives for the "post - Kyoto" era. After having examined the preferences of the three most active actors in the negotiation (USA, Europe, G77 + China) combined with the leadership capacities they possess, we identify three scenarios for the future : i) anarchy, ii) an international regime under the Ameri- can hegemony, iii) an international regime under the European leadership.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre Berthaud & Denise Cavard & Patrick Criqui, 2004. "Le régime international pour le climat, vers la consolidation ou l'effondrement ?," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 19(2), pages 163-188.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_2004_num_19_2_1550 Note: DOI:10.3406/rfeco.2004.1550
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Arora Seema & Cason Timothy N., 1995. "An Experiment in Voluntary Environmental Regulation: Participation in EPA's 33/50 Program," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 271-286, May.
    2. Anna Alberini & Kathleen Segerson, 2002. "Assessing Voluntary Programs to Improve Environmental Quality," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 22(1), pages 157-184, June.
    3. Seema Arora & Timothy N. Cason, 1996. "Why Do Firms Volunteer to Exceed Environmental Regulations? Understanding Participation in EPA's 33/50 Program," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 72(4), pages 413-432.
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