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Asymétries budgétaires dans la zone euro, un essai de modélisation du Pacte de stabilité

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  • Jérôme Creel

Abstract

[fre] Cet article envisage comment le Pacte de stabilité, en introduisant des contraintes sur les instruments de politique économique, peut conduire à un équilibre non optimal. Les pays dont les finances publiques sont « saines » peuvent voir leurs marges de manœuvre budgétaires se réduire considérablement du fait de l'incapacité des pays aux finances publiques déséquilibrées à engager une politique de stabilisation. Cette externalité négative s'applique aussi à la banque centrale : elle est susceptible de devoir s'impliquer davantage dans une politique de stabilisation macroéconomique. Pour illustrer ces mécanismes, un modèle dynamique à deux pays en union monétaire est présenté. Y sont incorporés des comportements patrimoniaux des ménages, permettant d'étudier précisément les implications de l'accumulation de dette publique sur les politiques monétaire et budgétaire à court et long terme. Au final, une coordination étroite entre les gouvernements et la ВСЕ est d'autant plus souhaitable que les dif- férentes externalités envisagées sont importantes. [eng] In this paper, we show how the Stability and Growth Pact can lead to a suboptimal macroeconomic equilibrium. Eurozone countries with sound public finances can undergo a sharp reduction in their fiscal margins for manoeuvre because of the inability of countries with unbalanced public finances to implement an active fiscal policy. This negative feedback effect also applies to the central bank: it may have to get more involved in the macroeconomic stabilisation of the whole EU. To illustrate these feedback effects, we use a two-country model in a monetary union with dynamics. Households' behaviour incorporates a wealth component. This enables a precise study of the different implications of public debt growth on the design of monetary and fiscal policies from the short to the long run. At last, gains from co-ordination are substantial and grow with the level of the feedback effects.

Suggested Citation

  • Jérôme Creel, 2002. "Asymétries budgétaires dans la zone euro, un essai de modélisation du Pacte de stabilité," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 16(3), pages 91-127.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_2002_num_16_3_1515
    Note: DOI:10.3406/rfeco.2002.1515
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Cornel Oros, 2009. "Economic Governance in an Asymmetric Monetary Union: A Fiscal Policy Game Analysis," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(3), pages 39-60.
    2. Séverine Menguy, 2005. "Hétérogénéité structurelle des pays membres et conflit dobjectifs entre les autorités économiques dans l'UEM," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 169(3), pages 41-58.
    3. Schalck, Christophe, 2006. "Coordination des Politiques Budgétaires dans une Union Monétaires Hétérogène: Modélisation et Application à l'UEM Coordination of Budgetary Policies in a Heterogeneous Monetary Union: Modelisation and," MPRA Paper 1435, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Cornel Oros, 2008. "Macroeconomic stabilization in a heterogeneous monetary union: some insights into the effects of fiscal policy coordination," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 5(34), pages 1-12.
    5. Schalck, Christophe, 2006. "Règles Budgétaires et Gestion du Policy-Mix dans l'UEM Budgetary Rules and Management of the Policy-Mix in the UME," MPRA Paper 1434, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Oct 2006.

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