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La nouvelle théorie de la régulation des monopoles naturels

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  • Philippe Gagnepain

Abstract

[fre] L'inefficacité d'une entreprise résulte d'un ensemble de caractéristiques et de décisions en partie non-identifiables par un observateur extérieur au processus de production. L'analyse économique récente a cherché à tirer parti de ces situations et a permis de les appréhender en traitant les problèmes d'asymétrie d'information entre une autorité et un agent. Ces problèmes intègrent des situations d'aléa moral où les agents prennent des actions non-observables par l'autorité et des situations d'anti-sélection où les agents disposent d'informations privées sur leur environnement technologique. La régulation des monopoles naturels a ainsi fait l'objet d'un réexamen à la lumière de la théorie des incitations à partir du début des années quatre-vingt. Cet article propose un aperçu de la nouvelle théorie de la régulation des monopoles naturels et tente de fournir un état presque exhaustif des travaux empiriques réalisés sur le sujet. [eng] The inefficiency of a firm depends on several characteristics and decisions which are non-observable by an external individual. The economic theory has recently taken into account these situations through asymmetric information problems between principals and agents. Such problems consider moral hazard and adverse selection issues. The regulation of natural monopolies has thus been re-examined through the window of the theory of incentives. This article proposes an overview of the new theory of regulation and tries to provide an almost exhaustive state of empirical works realized so far on the topic.

Suggested Citation

  • Philippe Gagnepain, 2001. "La nouvelle théorie de la régulation des monopoles naturels," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 15(4), pages 55-110.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_2001_num_15_4_1503
    Note: DOI:10.3406/rfeco.2001.1503
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