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Oligopole et contrats financiers optimaux

Listed author(s):
  • Jean-Daniel Guigou

[eng] This paper develops a simple non- cooperative game in which the design of financial contracts matters for firms' strategy. Standard debt contract is not optimal. More complex financial arrangements are chosen by firms at equilibrium. Loan commitment and debt-equity contracts commit firms to aggressive output strategies which go beyond those warranted by profit maximization. Firms face a prisonners' dilemma. [fre] Cet article développe un jeu non- coopératif simple dans lequel la forme des contrats financiers constitue une variable de la stratégie d'entreprise. Le contrat de dette standard n'est pas optimal : des arrangements financiers plus complexes sont choisis par les firmes à l'équilibre du jeu. Il en est ainsi des contrats d'engagement de prêt et des contrats de dette-action. Ces contrats incitent les firmes à développer des stratégies de production qui vont au-delà de celles exigées par la maximisation des profits. Les firmes sont ainsi confrontées à un dilemme du prisonnier.

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Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue française d'économie.

Volume (Year): 15 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 167-185

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Handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_2001_num_15_3_1500
Note: DOI:10.3406/rfeco.2001.1500
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