IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/prs/rfreco/rfeco_0769-0479_1998_num_13_2_1050.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

La banque saint-simonienne : le projet des Sociétés mutuelles de crédit des frères Pereire

Author

Listed:
  • Franck Yonnet

Abstract

[eng] This paper studies the 1853 Sociétés de crédit mutuel (SCM) scheme which was proposed to Napoléon III by the Pereire brothers, two Saint- Simonian bankers. This mutual bank scheme put a reform of the banking system forward. The Pereire brothers aimed at implementing the Saint- Simonian political programm : the emancipation of « labour » towards « capital ». The paper expounds the principles of the SCMs' neo-corporatism which both lies on the mutual benefit society (deriving from the collective and non hierarchical organisation of labour), and on banking practices (based on the accumulation of private informations against borrowers). Moreover, the paper tests the previous principles : it shows that the SCM subscribe to conditions which make them viable thanks to specific processes of asymmetric information. The paper concludes on the reasons which made this scheme not to be implemented. According to us, these are related to the very Saint-Simonian conception concerning the relationships between labour and capital. [fre] Nous examinons le projet des Sociétés de crédit mutuel (SCM) de 1853 proposé à Napoléon III par les frères Pereire, saint-simoniens et banquiers. Ce projet de banque mutuelle propose une réforme des institutions bancaires de l'époque dans le but de réaliser le programme politique saint-simonien : l'indépendance du « travail » à l'égard du « capital ». Nous exposons les principes du néocorporatisme des SCM qui s'appliquent à deux niveaux : mutuel, par l'organisation collective et non hiérarchique du travail ; bancaire, par l'accumulation d'informations privées sur les entrepreneurs. De plus, on teste les principes précités : on montre que les SCM sont viables sous certaines conditions qui découlent d'un traitement particulier de l'asymétrie de l'information. Nous concluons sur les raisons pour lesquelles le projet des SCM ne fut pas appliqué. Celles-ci tiennent, selon nous, à la conception saint-simonienne des rapports entre le travail et le capital.

Suggested Citation

  • Franck Yonnet, 1998. "La banque saint-simonienne : le projet des Sociétés mutuelles de crédit des frères Pereire," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 13(2), pages 59-99.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_1998_num_13_2_1050 Note: DOI:10.3406/rfeco.1998.1050
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.3406/rfeco.1998.1050
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: http://www.persee.fr/doc/rfeco_0769-0479_1998_num_13_2_1050
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bester, Helmut, 1994. "The Role of Collateral in a Model of Debt Renegotiation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 26(1), pages 72-86, February.
    2. Sharpe, Steven A, 1990. " Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending, and Implicit Contracts: A Stylized Model of Customer Relationships," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(4), pages 1069-1087, September.
    3. Diamond, Douglas W, 1989. "Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 828-862, August.
    4. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1992. "Asymmetric Information in Credit Markets and Its Implications for Macro-economics," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 44(4), pages 694-724, October.
    5. Haubrich, Joseph G., 1989. "Financial intermediation : Delegated monitoring and long-term relationships," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 9-20, March.
    6. Dorothée Rivaud-Danset, 1996. "Les contrats de crédit dans une relation de long terme. De la main invisible à la poignée de main," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 47(4), pages 937-962.
    7. Spence, Michael, 1974. "Competitive and optimal responses to signals: An analysis of efficiency and distribution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 296-332, March.
    8. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    9. Bester, Helmut, 1985. "Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 850-855, September.
    10. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_1998_num_13_2_1050. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Equipe PERSEE). General contact details of provider: http://www.persee.fr/collection/rfeco .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.