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Indépendance de la Banque centrale et politique monétaire: application à la Banque centrale euopéenne


  • Annabelle Mourougane


[eng] This paper sums up the main results developed by the literature about indépendance and credibility of the monetary policy and uses them to analyse the European Central Bank status. According to the Maastricht treaty, the ECB's main objective should be price stability and ECB should be indépendant from political pressures. This can be related to Rogoff 's theory of a conservative governor, which shows that a delegation to an indépendant monetary autority can both reduce the inflationary bias induced by a lack of credibility, and limit fluctuations on the labour market after a supply shock. [fre] Rogoff. Cette délégation de pouvoir monétaire à un gouverneur indépendant permettrait de baisser le biais inflationniste, issu d'un manque initial de crédibilité, tout en conservant la possibilité de limiter les fluctuations consécutives à des chocs d'offre sur le marché du travail.

Suggested Citation

  • Annabelle Mourougane, 1998. "Indépendance de la Banque centrale et politique monétaire: application à la Banque centrale euopéenne," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 13(1), pages 135-197.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_1998_num_13_1_1043
    Note: DOI:10.3406/rfeco.1998.1043

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Sharmini Coorey, 1991. "The Determinants of U.S. Real Interest Rates in the Long Run," IMF Working Papers 91/118, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
    3. Correia-Nunes, Jose & Stemitsiotis, Loukas, 1995. "Budget Deficit and Interest Rates: Is There a Link? International Evidence," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 57(4), pages 425-449, November.
    4. Ball, Laurence, 1995. "Disinflation with imperfect credibility," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 5-23, February.
    5. Ford, Robert & Laxton, Douglas, 1999. "World Public Debt and Real Interest Rates," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(2), pages 77-94, Summer.
    6. Ball, Laurence, 1994. "Credible Disinflation with Staggered Price-Setting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 282-289, March.
    7. Plosser, Charles I., 1982. "Government financing decisions and asset returns," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 325-352.
    8. Howard Howe & Charles Pigott, 1991. "Determinants of long-term interest rates: an empirical study of several industrial countries," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Win, pages 12-28.
    9. Barro, Robert J, 1992. " World Interest Rates and Investment," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 94(2), pages 323-342.
    10. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
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