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Etat-providence et efficacité économique

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  • Henri-Jean Gathon
  • Pierre Pestieau

Abstract

[eng] This paper assesses the relative efficiency of a number of components of the welfare state. It also tries to explain the efficiency slacks so observed. It appears that one of the main ways of fostering efficiency is to introduce flexibility in both management and organization and to allow for competition, where it is possible. These measures are often found to be more effective than mere privatization. [fre] L'objet de cet article est d'évaluer le degré d'inefficacité de diverses composantes de l'Etat-providence et d'expliquer les raisons des disparités qui peuvent apparaître. Nous indiquons que les inefficacités ainsi observées peuvent être résorbées, en partie en tout cas, en introduisant plus de flexibilité dans la gestion et l'organisation et, là où cela s'y prête, une certaine concurrence. Ces mesures nous paraissent plus performantes que le recours à la privatisation pour générer des gains d'efficacité et en quelque sorte refinancer de l'intérieur un Etat- providence qui en a bien besoin.

Suggested Citation

  • Henri-Jean Gathon & Pierre Pestieau, 1996. "Etat-providence et efficacité économique," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 11(2), pages 29-43.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_1996_num_11_2_1002 Note: DOI:10.3406/rfeco.1996.1002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Pemberton, James, 1988. "A 'Managerial' Model of the Trade Union," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 98(392), pages 755-771, September.
    3. Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer.
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    6. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    7. Aghion, Philippe, 1993. "Economic reform in Eastern Europe : Can theory help?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(2-3), pages 525-532, April.
    8. Wladimir Andreff, 1995. "Le contrôle des entreprises privatisées dans les économies en transition : une approche théorique," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 46(3), pages 763-773.
    9. Cornia, Giovanni Andrea, 1994. "Poverty, Food Consumption, and Nutrition during the Transition to the Market Economy in Eastern Europe," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 297-302, May.
    10. Doiron, Denise J, 1992. "Bargaining Power and Wage-Employment Contracts in a Unionized Industry," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 33(3), pages 583-606, August.
    11. Wladimir Andreff, 1995. "Le contrôle des entreprises privatisées dans les économies en transition: Une approche théorique," Post-Print halshs-00274943, HAL.
    12. Bonin, John P., 1992. "Privatization and efficient contracts: The workers' stake in the transition," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 716-732, December.
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