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Acquisition et concurrence oligopolistique mondiale. Le cas des groupes industriels français

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  • Claude Pottier

Abstract

[fre] Cet article situe les stratégies d'acquisition des groupes industriels français dans la concurrence oligopolistique mondiale, afin d'analyser nature des effets de dimension mis œuvre et leur rôle en tant qu'avantages compétitifs et barrières à l'entrée. La recherche d'une taille critique dans les fonctions que sont la R-D, la publicité et marketing, pousse à des concentrations sectorielles à l'échelle avec une spécialisation des groupes. L'élévation des tailles critiques s'analyser comme un des barrières à l'entrée mais témoigne, pour le moment, d'une intensification de la concurrence. [eng] In this paper merger and acquisition strategies of large French companies are analyzed within the context of global oligopolistic competition. It aims at a better understanding of the dimension effects involved : their nature and their role as competitive advantages and barriers to entry. The search of critical sizes in strategic functions, such as R-D, advertising and marketing, leads to sectorial concentrations at a global scale, with a specialization of firms. The growth of critical sizes tends to strengthen barriers to entry but, at the time being, it is an indication of fierce international competition between firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Claude Pottier, 1993. "Acquisition et concurrence oligopolistique mondiale. Le cas des groupes industriels français," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 8(2), pages 177-208.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_1993_num_8_2_932 Note: DOI:10.3406/rfeco.1993.932
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Elisabeth Kremp, 1995. "Restructurations et rentabilité économique dans l'industrie française de 1985 à 1992," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, pages 29-44.

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