IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/prs/rfreco/rfeco_0769-0479_1993_num_8_2_930.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Concurrence et incitations dans le système hospitalier

Author

Listed:
  • Michel Mougeot

Abstract

[fre] Après avoir mis en évidence les problèmes posés aux systèmes de santé par la conjonction de l'incertitude et de l'asymétrie d'information, cet article analyse certains mécanismes incitatifs ayant pour but la maîtrise des dépenses. Une première partie est consacrée à des règles instaurant une concurrence fictive entre offreurs : politique d'enveloppe globale et tarification en fonction d'une moyenne. La seconde partie analyse les procédures de concurrence organisée : enchères mises en place par des acheteurs de soins (P.P.O., A.H.C.C.S. aux États-Unis, livre blanc anglais), organisation d'une concurrence des offreurs et des assureurs (H.M.O., plan Dekker). [eng] Michel Mougeot Competition and incentives in the health care system. This paper analyses the consequences of uncertainty and asymmetric information on the organisation of health care system. It considers the implementation of incentive mechanisms in some countries. In the first part, the author analyses the fictitious competition mechanisms : global envelope policy, yardstick competition. In the second part, he studies the competitive bidding mechanisms (P. P.O. or A.H.C.C.S. in the United States, tender procedures in the «working for patient» project in the United Kindom, Dekker plan in the Nether- land, H.M.O.).

Suggested Citation

  • Michel Mougeot, 1993. "Concurrence et incitations dans le système hospitalier," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 8(2), pages 109-131.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_1993_num_8_2_930 Note: DOI:10.3406/rfeco.1993.930
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.3406/rfeco.1993.930
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: http://www.persee.fr/doc/rfeco_0769-0479_1993_num_8_2_930
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Joskow, Paul L, 1988. "Price Adjustment in Long-term Contracts: The Case of Coal," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(1), pages 47-83, April.
    2. Goldberg, Victor P & Erickson, John R, 1987. "Quantity and Price Adjustment in Long-term Contracts: A Case Study of Petroleum Coke," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(2), pages 369-398, October.
    3. Yeon-Koo Che & Tai-Yeong Chung, 1999. "Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 84-105.
    4. Keith J. Crocker & Kenneth J. Reynolds, 1993. "The Efficiency of Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Air Force Engine Procurement," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(1), pages 126-146, Spring.
    5. Riordan, Michael H. & Williamson, Oliver E., 1985. "Asset specificity and economic organization," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 365-378, December.
    6. Shelanski, Howard A & Klein, Peter G, 1995. "Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 335-361, October.
    7. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1994. "The Firm as an Incentive System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 972-991, September.
    8. Joskow, Paul L, 1987. "Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(1), pages 168-185, March.
    9. Klein, Benjamin, 1996. "Why Hold-Ups Occur: The Self-Enforcing Range of Contractual Relationships," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 34(3), pages 444-463, July.
    10. Leffler, Keith B & Rucker, Randal R, 1991. "Transactions Costs and the Efficient Organization of Production: A Study of Timber-Harvesting Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(5), pages 1060-1087, October.
    11. repec:mes:jeciss:v:30:y:1996:i:4:p:1212-1216 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Williamson, Oliver E, 1983. "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 519-540, September.
    13. Georg Noldeke & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1995. "Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A Solution to the Hold-Up Problem," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 163-179.
    14. Crocker, Keith J & Masten, Scott E, 1996. "Regulation and Administered Contracts Revisited: Lessons from Transaction-Cost Economics for Public Utility Regulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 5-39, January.
    15. Masten, Scott E & Crocker, Keith J, 1985. "Efficient Adaptation in Long-term Contracts: Take-or-Pay Provisions for Natural Gas," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 1083-1093, December.
    16. Kreps, David M, 1996. "Markets and Hierarchies and (Mathematical) Economic Theory," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(2), pages 561-595.
    17. Jean Tirole, 1999. "Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 741-782, July.
    18. Masten, Scott E, 1984. "The Organization of Production: Evidence from the Aerospace Industry," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(2), pages 403-417, October.
    19. Keith J. Crocker & Scott E. Masten, 1988. "Mitigating Contractual Hazards: Unilateral Options and Contract Length," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(3), pages 327-343, Autumn.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Maryse Gadreau & Claude Schneider-Bunner, 1997. "L'équité dans le modèle de "concurrence organisée" pour la régulation d'un système de santé," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 129(3), pages 221-237.
    2. Domin, Jean-Paul, 2015. "Réformer l’hôpital comme une entreprise. Les errements de trente ans de politique hospitalière (1983-2013)," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 17.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_1993_num_8_2_930. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Equipe PERSEE). General contact details of provider: http://www.persee.fr/collection/rfeco .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.