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Fiscalité européenne et efficacité économique


  • André Fourçans


[fre] Cet article analyse les propositions de réformes fiscales au plan européen à la lumière des critères d'optimalité. Après un développement sur les fondements théoriques de ces critères, il analyse dans quelle mesure ces propositions satisfont aux conditions de l'optimalité économique, notamment en ce qui concerne les distorsions entre pays. Sont étudiées la fiscalité de l'épargne, celle de la T.V.A. et des accises, puis la fiscalité des entreprises et celle transfrontière; sont aussi abordées les conséquences possibles des prélèvements sur les salaires. En règle générale, on peut conclure que les réformes proposées (dont certaines sont déjà appliquées) ne devraient pas être sources de distorsions et d'inefficiences supplémentaires significatives; elles devraient au contraire conduire à l'élimination d'un certain nombre de celle-ci, sinon dans l'immédiat du moins à terme si les objectifs fiscaux affichés sont atteints. [eng] The aim of this article is to analyse to what extent European tax reform proposals are in line with optimality criteria. After a brief review of the literature, proposals are analysed in terms of distortions and efficiency. Taxes on investment income, V.A.T. and excise taxes, corporate and cross-border taxes are evaluated in this light. It is shown that the new European tax system should not, generally, be source of new important distorsions and inefficiencies; on the contrary it should lead to the elimination of many of those, if not immediately, at least in the medium- terme, as far as the avowed tax reform proposals are implemented.

Suggested Citation

  • André Fourçans, 1993. "Fiscalité européenne et efficacité économique," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 8(2), pages 41-73.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_1993_num_8_2_928
    Note: DOI:10.3406/rfeco.1993.928

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    References listed on IDEAS

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