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Le rôle de l'incertitude dans la coordination internationale des politiques économiques

  • Daniel Delalande
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    [fre] Une large partie de la littérature sur la coordination internationale des politiques économiques a insisté sur les gains en bien-être qu'on pouvait en attendre. En revanche, une autre partie en souligne la faiblesse voire les coûts. Parmi les arguments avancés, l'incertitude joue un rôle central. Celle-ci porte sur la situation économique (distance par rapport à l'optimum) et l'effet des diverses actions envisageables (signes et valeurs des multiplicateurs associés à la politique monétaire ou à la politique budgétaire). Elle concerne également le comportement des acteurs de la coordination (tentations de reniement et problèmes de crédibilité). Pour comprendre les appels réitérés des gouvernements à une coopération internationale des politiques économiques, malgré la faiblesse des gains, l'analyse économique doit abandonner l'hypothèse d'Etats conçus comme des despotes bienveillants pour intégrer les intérêts des bureaucraties nationales et internationales, les préférences des dirigeants politiques et les contraintes électorales auxquelles ils sont soumis. Je remercie P. Vornetti et J.D. Lafay et J. Lecaillon pour leurs commentaires et suggestions. [eng] When a large part of the economic literature dealing with international macroeconomic policy coordination emphasizes on the possible welfare gains, another fraction underlines either the weakness of the gains or the welfare losses. In this debate, uncertainty plays a central role. It relates to the economic situation — distance towards optimum — and to the impact of multiple putative actions - signs and magnitude of money multipliers or fiscal multipliers. Uncertainty is also affected by the behavior of coordination actors: temptation of renunciation and problems of credibility. In order to understand the contradiction between the weakness of the gains and the willingness of governments to cooperate, economic analysis must give up the assumption of benevolent despote. It is necessary to integrate the interests of national and international bureaucracies, the preferences of politicians and governments as well as their electoral contraints.

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    Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue française d'économie.

    Volume (Year): 7 (1992)
    Issue (Month): 3 ()
    Pages: 61-74

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    Handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_1992_num_7_3_1315
    Note: DOI:10.3406/rfeco.1992.1315
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