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Protection endogène des biens intermédiaires en agence commune

Listed author(s):
  • Estelle Dhont-Peltrault
Registered author(s):

    [fre] Protection endogène des biens intermédiaires en agence commune À partir du modèle de contributions politiques développé par Grossman et Helpman [1994], nous montrons que le pouvoir politique des différents agents de l'économie ainsi que le niveau et la structure des taux de protection à l'équilibre diffèrent suivant la nature des barèmes de contributions des groupes de pression. Si, dans certains cas, l'existence d'un contre-lobbying actif des secteurs aval permet de retrouver le phénomène de progressivité des tarifs, il est cependant possible qu'à l'équilibre les biens intermédiaires soient mieux protégés que les biens finals. [eng] Endogenous protection of intermediate goods in a common agency framework Using influence-driven approach developedby Grossman and Helpman [1994], we show that the level and the structure of protection rates that emerge in the political equilibrium depend on the nature of the contribution schedules made by lobbies. Whereas in some cases tariff escalation occurs due to consumer goods counter-lobbying, intermediate goods may however be better protected than consumer goods in the political equilibrium.

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    Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue économique.

    Volume (Year): 53 (2002)
    Issue (Month): 3 ()
    Pages: 459-468

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    Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_2002_num_53_3_410417
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