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Package Bidding : Vickrey vs. Ascending Auctions


  • Lawrence M. Ausubel
  • Paul R. Milgrom


[eng] Package Bidding Vickrey vs. Ascending Auctions. . The Vickrey and ascending package auctions are found to have identical equilibrium performance in the case where goods are substitutes. In the remaining cases, the Vickrey auction retains its incentive advantages ai the cost of setting prices that are so low that the outcome is not in the core of the corresponding exchange economy. The Vickrey auction also introduces blases that distort investments in new technology. By contrast, the ascending package auction has its equi-librium outcomes in the core, provides neutral investirent incentives, and is easier for bidders to understand and manage. [fre] Encheres par lots : mecanisme de Vickrey ou enchères ascendantes. . On démontre que les enchères à la Vickrey et les enchères ascendantes par lots ont des propriétés similaires dans le cas où les biens concernés sont des substituts. Dans les autres cas, les mécanismes de Vickrey conservent leurs pro­priétés incitatives, mais conduisent à des prix si bas que le résultat n'appartient pas au noyau de l'économie d'échange concernée. Les enchères à la Vickrey induisent par ailleurs des biais qui affectent les investissements dans les nouvelles technologies. Par contraste, les enchères ascendantes par lots produisent un équilibre qui appartient au noyau de l'économie, sont neutres en matière d'incitations à l'investissement et sont plus simples à comprendre et à gérer pour les participants au mécanisme.

Suggested Citation

  • Lawrence M. Ausubel & Paul R. Milgrom, 2002. "Package Bidding : Vickrey vs. Ascending Auctions," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 53(3), pages 391-402.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_2002_num_53_3_410411
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.2002.410411

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