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Le rôle de la relation de clientèle comme barrière à l'entrée sur les marchés bancaires


  • Laurent Weill


[fre] Le rôle de la relation de clientèle comme barrière à l'entrée sur les marchés bancaires. . L'article apporte une justification théorique au rôle de la relation de clientèle comme barrière stratégique à l'entrée sur les marchés bancaires. Une banque qui consent un prêt à un client acquiert un avantage comparatif en termes d'information sur ce client par rapport aux banques concurrentes. Cette asymétrie d'information confère alors à la banque un pouvoir de monopole sur ses clients : la relation de clientèle agit ainsi comme un « switching cost » pour les emprunteurs. Nous élaborons un modèle de barrières à l'entrée stratégiques où la relation de clientèle permet à une banque implantée sur un marché bancaire de prévenir l'entrée d'une banque plus efficiente. [eng] Customer relationship as a strategic barrier to entry on banking markets. . This paper aims at providing theoretical foundations to the role of customer relationship as a strategic barrier to entry on banking markets. A bank which grants a loan to a customer gains a comparative advantage in information on this customer as compared with competitors. This informational asymmetry gives to the bank a monopoly power on its customers: customer relationship acte as a "switching cost" for the borrowers. We elaborate a model of strategie barriers to entry in which customer relationship allows the incumbent bank to prevent the entry of a more efficient bank.

Suggested Citation

  • Laurent Weill, 2002. "Le rôle de la relation de clientèle comme barrière à l'entrée sur les marchés bancaires," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 53(2), pages 201-222.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_2002_num_53_2_410400

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    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation


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