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Taille du système de retraite par répartition et âge optimal de départ à la retraite


  • Patrick Artus


[eng] Size of the payas you go pension system and optimal retirement age. . We examine the determination of the optimal (from the point of view of social welfare) retirement age. We analyze the relationship between the choice of the retirement age and the choice of the nature of the pension system (relative shares of the pay-as-you-go and of the capitalized system).. We compare two situations: in the first one, the retirement age is compulsory and chosen by the authorities; in the second one, wage-earners can freely decide to retire later, which increases the level of the pension they will get for a given level of contribution to the pay-as-you-go system.. We use a theoretical overlapping generations model, where consumers choose between consumption and leisure, and where the authorities maximize social welfare using two instruments: retirement age (at least in the case they can freely choose it); the structure of the pension system.. We show in particular that wage earners spontaneously choose to retire too late (from the point of view of welfare), since they ignore the link between retirement age, real wages and real interest rates. [fre] Taille du système de retraite par répartition et âge optimal de départ à la retraite. . Nous examinons la détermination de l'âge optimal (du point de vue du bien-être) de départ à la retraite. Nous regardons comment le choix de cet âge optimal interréagit avec celui de la taille du système de retraite par répartition. Nous comparons deux situations : l'un où le départ à la retraite est obligatoire à un certain âge ; l'un où le maintien en activité au-delà d'un certain âge minimal permet d'ac­croître le niveau de retraite, et peut être choisi librement par les salariés.. Nous utilisons un modèle théorique à générations imbriquées, où les consommateurs arbitrent entre consommation et loisir, et où les autorités maximisent le bien-être social à l'aide de deux instruments : l'âge de départ à la retraite (dans le cas où les autorités le choisissent), la structure du système de retraites entre ca­pitalisation et répartition.. Nous montrons, en particulier, que les salariés choisissent spontanément un âge de la retraite trop élevé (du point de vue du bien-être), car ils ignorent le lien entre l'âge de la retraite, le salaire réel et le taux d'intérêt réel d'équilibre.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrick Artus, 2001. "Taille du système de retraite par répartition et âge optimal de départ à la retraite," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 52(4), pages 773-790.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_2001_num_52_4_410356

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. R. Bruce Billings, 1982. "Specification of Block Rate Price Variables in Demand Models," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 58(3), pages 386-394.
    2. Lars Gårn Hansen, 1996. "Water and Energy Price Impacts on Residential Water Demand in Copenhagen," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 72(1), pages 66-79.
    3. Michael L. Nieswiadomy & David J. Molina, 1989. "Comparing Residential Water Demand Estimates under Decreasing and Increasing Block Rates Using Household Data," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 65(3), pages 280-289.
    4. J. E. Schefter & E. L. David, 1985. "Estimating Residential Water Demand under Multi-Part Tariffs Using Aggregate Data," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 64(3), pages 272-280.
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