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Relation verticale et régulation. Le problème des biens intermédiaires


  • François Boldron
  • Cyril Hariton


[eng] Regulation and unregulated essential facility. . This paper shows that a regulator should not regulate a final product which industry is characterized by the need of an unregulated essential facility sold through non-linear tariffs. Two main reasons drive this result. First, the regulator maximizes social welfare and values more the final good production than the producer itself. Second, the regulator has access to an extra source of financing with the profits of the whole regulated sector. [fre] Cet article montre qu'un régulateur ne doit pas réguler une industrie nécessitant un bien intermédiaire essentiel non régulé et vendu par un tarif binôme. En effet, le régulateur maximisant le bien-être social sous contrainte budgétaire, il attribue une valeur plus importante à la production du bien final que le producteur lui-même. De plus, ce régulateur a accès à des fonds plus importants que le producteur grâce aux profits possibles de l'ensemble des activités régulées.

Suggested Citation

  • François Boldron & Cyril Hariton, 2001. "Relation verticale et régulation. Le problème des biens intermédiaires," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 52(3), pages 655-664.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_2001_num_52_3_410345
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.2001.410345

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    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation


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