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Coordination des politiques budgétaires entre pays et variable de stratégie de la Banque centrale

Listed author(s):
  • Daniel Laskar

[eng] International coordination of fiscal policies and strategy variable of the central bank In a two-country model where the policy-mix in response to symmetric shocks is considered, we analyze the effect of the coordination of fiscal policies between countries in a monetary union and under a flexible exchange rate. It is shown that results can be very different depending on what is taken as the strategy variable of the central bank at the Nash equilibrium. When this variable is the nominal interest rate, international coordination of fiscal policies is beneficial only in a monetary union. But when the strategy variable of the central bank is the inflation rate, the gain of such a coordination is smaller in a monetary union than under a flexible exchange rate. [fre] Dans un modèle à deux pays où on considère le policy-mix en réponse à des chocs symétriques, on examine l'effet de la coordination des politiques budgétaires entre pays selon qu'on est en union monétaire ou en change flexible. On montre que les résultats obtenus sont très différents selon ce qu'on prend comme variable de stratégie de la Banque centrale à l'équilibre de Nash. Lorsque celle-ci est le taux d'intérêt nominal, coordonner les politiques budgétaires entre pays n'est bénéfique qu'en union monétaire. Mais quand la stratégie de la Banque centrale est le taux d'inflation, le gain d'une telle coordination est plus faible en union monétaire qu'en change flexible.

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Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue économique.

Volume (Year): 52 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 553-561

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Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_2001_num_52_3_410336
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