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Externalités budgétaires et choix du banquier central dans une union monétaire. La délégation comme solution coopérative de second rang

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  • Pierre Faure

Abstract

[fre] Même s'il n'existe aucun problème d'incohérence temporelle, les États membres d'une union monétaire ont intérêt à nommer un gouverneur qui ne partage pas leurs préférences, en raison des externalités des politiques budgétaires. La modification volontaire de l'arbitrage inflation-chômage est analysée comme un mécanisme de coordination de second rang. Le banquier central optimal peut être « progressiste » (moins soucieux de la stabilité des prix), et cette délégation plus efficace qu'une règle prohibant les déficits budgétaires. [eng] Fiscal spillovers and choice of central banker in a monetary union: delegation as a second-best form of fiscal coordination In a monetary union, the incentives of national authorities to misrepresent their true preferences still exist in the absence of time inconsistency issues. With fiscal spillovers among countries, delegating the control of monetary policy to a central banker with a different output-inflation trade-off is a second-best form of fiscal co­ordination and raises welfare. A populist governor (less inflation averse) may out­perform a ceiling on fiscal deficits.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre Faure, 2001. "Externalités budgétaires et choix du banquier central dans une union monétaire. La délégation comme solution coopérative de second rang," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 52(1), pages 35-60.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_2001_num_52_1_410300 Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.2001.410300
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Creane, Anthony, 1995. "Endogenous Learning, Learning by Doing and Information Sharing," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(4), pages 985-1002, November.
    2. R. Aversi & G. Dosi & G. Fagiolo & M. Meacci & C. Olivetti, 1997. "Demand Dynamics With Socially Evolving Preferences," Working Papers ir97081, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
    3. Cowan, Robin, 1991. "Tortoises and Hares: Choice among Technologies of Unknown Merit," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(407), pages 801-814, July.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy

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