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Mécanismes de résolution de la cessation des paiements et préférences individuelles

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  • Essaid Tarbalouti

Abstract

[fre] Cet article analyse les différents mécanismes de résolution de la cessation des paiements et leur impact sur la maximisation de la valeur de l'entreprise. On démontre que les mécanismes de résolution ex-post à la cessation des paiements ne permettent pas cette maximisation suite à la divergence des préférences des individus. On fournit une approche en termes contractuels et on montre que l'établissement des clauses ex-ante à la faillite influence les préférences des individus et permet la maximisation de la valeur de l'entreprise. [eng] Resolution mecanisms of bankruptcy and individual preferences In this paper we analysis a different mecanisms of resolution of bankruptcy and the impact on maximization of return. We show how the mecanisms of ex-post resolution to the bankruptcy do not favor the maximization of returns. We also provide our analysis under which a debtor and a creditor will be forced to respect their commitments. Thus, although the debtor may have his preference with respect to her own returns, he may maximize the joint return with regard to contract ex-ante commitment.

Suggested Citation

  • Essaid Tarbalouti, 2000. "Mécanismes de résolution de la cessation des paiements et préférences individuelles," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 51(6), pages 1381-1396.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_2000_num_51_6_410590
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    1. Vincent Merlin & Dominique Lepelley, 1999. "Analyses géométriques et probabilistes des règles de vote, avec une application au scrutin majoritaire à deux tours," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 50(4), pages 699-714.
    2. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    3. Fleurbaey, Marc & Suzumura, Kotaro & Tadenuma, Koichi, 2000. "Informational Requirements for Social Choice in Economic Environments," Discussion Papers 2000-07, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    4. Wilson, Robert, 1972. "Social choice theory without the Pareto Principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 478-486, December.
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