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Système de retraite, inégalités de revenus et de patrimoine

Author

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  • Patrick Artus
  • Florence Legros

Abstract

[eng] Pension system and income and wealth inequalities. . . When analyzing the choice of a pension system (between a pay as a go system and a capitalized system), one generally focuses on the effects of that choice on savings, on the equilibrium interest rate and wage, hence on the capital stock available in the economy. One also analyzes the effects, depending on the dominant pension system, of the relative yield of the two systems on the discounted income of consumers. . We include in the analysis the income distribution between skilled (high wage) and unskilled (low-wage) wage earners and pensioners, concentrating on the possibility that unskilled pensioners get a very low pension level. . We use an overlapping generations model, introducing an altruistic behavior which justifies the existence of a bequest between generations and a possible liquidity constraint for unskilled wage earners. . The choice of the optimum pension system can differ very much of the one obtained with a single group of wage-earners. The introduction of wealth inequalities through bequests leads to a substantial change in the results, making the concerned consumers indifferent to the design of the pension system and by making production independent from the nature of the pension system. We use an overlapping generations model, introducing an altruistic behavior which justifies the existence of a bequest between generations and a possible liquidity constraint for unskilled wage earners.. The choice of the optimum pension system can differ very much of the one obtained with a single group of wage-earners. The introduction of wealth inequalities through bequests leads to a substantial change in the results, making the concerned consumers indifferent to the design of the pension system and by making production independent from the nature of the pension system. [fre] Lorsqu'on examine le choix du système de retraite (part de la répartition et de la capitalisation), on se préoccupe en général de l'effet sur l'épargne, le taux d'intérêt et les salaires d'équilibre, donc sur le niveau de capital par tête de l'économie ; aussi du rendement relatif de la répartition et de la capitalisation, et de son effet sur le lien entre le système de retraite et le revenu actualisé des consommateurs.. Nous incluons dans l'analyse la répartition des revenus entre les salariés (puis retraités) qualifiés (à revenus élevés) et non qualifiés (à revenus faibles), en nous préoccupant du niveau peut-être très faible des retraites obtenues par les non-qualifiés. Nous utilisons un modèle à générations imbriquées pouvant faire intervenir un comportement altruiste justifiant l'existence d'héritage, ainsi qu'une contrainte de liquidité portant sur les salariés non qualifiés. Le choix du système optimal de retraite peut différer nettement de celui obtenu avec une seule catégorie de salariés. L'introduction d'une inégalité patrimoniale avec l'héritage modifie substantiellement les résultats en rendant les individus concernés insensibles au choix du système de retraite et en rendant le niveau de production indépendant de la nature du système de retraite.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrick Artus & Florence Legros, 2000. "Système de retraite, inégalités de revenus et de patrimoine," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 51(1), pages 27-40.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_2000_num_51_1_410494
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