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Conflits d'agence au sein des fonds de pension privés. L'exemple américain

Listed author(s):
  • Najat El Mekkaoui
  • Anne Lavigne

[fre] Cet article traite des conflits d'agence qui peuvent apparaître dans le fonctionnement des fonds de pension. L'accent est mis sur les relations d'agence induites par la gestion financière des fonds privés à prestations définies de droit américain. Après avoir traité des caractéristiques juridiques relatives à la gestion administrative et financière des fonds de pension, nous identifions les différents conflits d'agence qui peuvent apparaître dans leur fonctionnement. Puis nous formalisons ces relations entre les différentes parties prenantes et montrons que la délégation de gestion modifie la prise de risque dans la gestion financière des fonds. [eng] Principal-agent relationships and pension fund portfolio selection. This paper deals with the principal-agent relationships involved by the management of pension funds. The focus is made on private defined benefit pension funds in the US. We first underline the main characteristics of management and financial pension policy. We then identify the principal-agent relationships in a context of asymmetric information. In a last section, a principal-agent model shows that the delegation of portfolio decision may increase risk taking to the detriment of the pension beneficiaries.

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Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue économique.

Volume (Year): 51 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 187-205

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Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_2000_hos_51_1_410490
Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.2000.410490
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