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Incertitude sur la demande et incitations au partage de l'information dans un duopole

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  • Florent Venayre

Abstract

[fre] Demand uncertainty and incentives to share information in duopoly. . We study the incentives to share information in a duopoly when firms can suffer from a lack of information about demand. We show that if the risk of suffering from a lack of information is not too high, the information sharing is always mutually profitable for the firms, regardless of the competition or the nature of the goods. Moreover, we show that the informational behavior of the firms depends on two factors: the kind of demand uncertainty and the assumptions made about information. [eng] Demand uncertainty and incentives to share information in duopoly. . We study the incentives to share information in a duopoly when firms can suffer from a lack of information about demand. We show that if the risk of suffering from a lack of information is not too high, the information sharing is always mutually profitable for the firms, regardless of the competition or the nature of the goods. Moreover, we show that the informational behavior of the firms depends on two factors: the kind of demand uncertainty and the assumptions made about information.

Suggested Citation

  • Florent Venayre, 1999. "Incertitude sur la demande et incitations au partage de l'information dans un duopole," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 50(3), pages 601-610.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1999_num_50_3_410105
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    Cited by:

    1. Medín, J. Andrés Faíña & Rodríguez, Jesús López & Rodríguez, José López, 2003. "Information Exchanges in Cournot Duopolies," Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil), vol. 57(1), January.

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