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Cycle politique partisan et crédibilité de parités fixes

Listed author(s):
  • Pierre-Guillaume Méon

[fre] Cycle politique partisan et crédibilité de parités fixes Cet article a pour objet d'expliquer pourquoi les régimes de changes fixes sont fragilisés après des échéances électorales. Dans un système bipartite, si l'un des partis ne peut soutenir des parités fixes de façon crédible, et a une probabilité non nulle d'être élu, les agents vont anticiper une dépréciation positive. Si son adversaire crédible arrive au pouvoir et conserve des changes fixes, il créera une surprise déflationniste qui se traduira par un choc réel négatif au lendemain du scrutin. Pour absorber ce choc « électoral », il pourra opter pour les changes flexibles. [eng] Partisan cycle and the credibility of fixed parities This article aims at explaining why fixed exchange rates regimes are weakened by elections. In a bipartisan system, if a party cannot credibly commit to the defence of fixed parities and has a positive probability to win the ballot, private agents will anticipate a positive rate of inflation. Consequently, if its credible challenger is elected and tries to maintain fixed parities, he will cause a negative real shock on the day following the vote. In order to cushion this purely "electoral" shock, he will be tempted to renege on its commitment to fixed parities.

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Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue économique.

Volume (Year): 50 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 87-112

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Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1999_num_50_1_410064
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