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Les jeux répétés. Un instrument de décision pour les autorités concurrentielles


  • Thierry Pénard


[fre] Les jeux répétés. Un instrument de décision pour les autorités concurrentielles. . Face à des ententes secrètes et tacites, les autorités concurrentielles ne peuvent plus se satisfaire des moyens d'investigation classiques ; elles doivent s'appuyer sur l'analyse économique. À partir de la théorie des jeux répétés, nous établissons quelques principes d'action en matière de lutte contre la collusion. Ces principes sont confrontés aux positions de la Commission européenne dans des affaires d'échanges d'information et de concertations. [eng] Some implications of repeated games for antitrust policy. . How can an antitrust authority detect and convict tacit and secrete price-fixing agreements ? A solution may be to make use of the repeated games theory as an analytical framework of the firms' behaviour. From this theory, we draw some les­sons and some rules of conduct to deter collusion. These rules are confronted with the position of the European Commission on information exchanges and concerted practices.

Suggested Citation

  • Thierry Pénard, 1998. "Les jeux répétés. Un instrument de décision pour les autorités concurrentielles," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 49(3), pages 743-753.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1998_num_49_3_410006

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