Les jeux répétés. Un instrument de décision pour les autorités concurrentielles
[fre] Les jeux répétés. Un instrument de décision pour les autorités concurrentielles Face à des ententes secrètes et tacites, les autorités concurrentielles ne peuvent plus se satisfaire des moyens d'investigation classiques ; elles doivent s'appuyer sur l'analyse économique. À partir de la théorie des jeux répétés, nous établissons quelques principes d'action en matière de lutte contre la collusion. Ces principes sont confrontés aux positions de la Commission européenne dans des affaires d'échanges d'information et de concertations. [eng] Some implications of repeated games for antitrust policy How can an antitrust authority detect and convict tacit and secrete price-fixing agreements ? A solution may be to make use of the repeated games theory as an analytical framework of the firms' behaviour. From this theory, we draw some lessons and some rules of conduct to deter collusion. These rules are confronted with the position of the European Commission on information exchanges and concerted practices.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1998_num_49_3_410006. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Equipe PERSEE)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.