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La gestion du rapport salarial : une modélisation du rôle des incitations et des institutions

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  • Pascal Petit
  • Irina Peaucelle

Abstract

[fre] La gestion du rapport salarial une modélisation du rôle des incitations et des institutions . . L'intensité et la qualité du travail résultent d'un ensemble d'incitations liées à l'organisation du travail et aux modes de rémunération. On a cherché à préciser la façon dont le contexte institutionnel juridique et conventionnel, qui encadre l'établissement et la réalisation du contrat de travail, influence la mise en œuvre de ces différentes formes d'incitation. Une modélisation simple des interrelations entre l'arbitrage des firmes en matière de gestion salariale et les facteurs macro­économiques keynésiens de la protection sociale donne une forme précise aux interdépendances entre les dimensions micro et macro-économique du rapport salarial.. Une application empirique essaie de valider le schéma proposé en s'appuyant sur un choix raisonné pour comparer les rapports salariaux de quelques économies développées. [eng] Monitoring the wage-labour relationship : a model of the role of incentives and institutions. . Intensity and quality of work resuit from incentives which are linked with work organization and compensation schemes.. We have tried to specify the way in which the insututional framework, which surrounds the achievment of labour contracts, influences the choices and the effects of work incentives.. A simple modeling of the interplay between firms' employment policies and macro keynesian dynamic of welfare states allows to account within a precise scheme for the micro and macro dimensions of the wage relationship.. A empirical analysis tends to validate the previous scheme in caracterizing a typology of wage relationships among developped economies, through a set of factor analyses.

Suggested Citation

  • Pascal Petit & Irina Peaucelle, 1991. "La gestion du rapport salarial : une modélisation du rôle des incitations et des institutions," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 42(3), pages 493-520.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1991_num_42_3_409291
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1991.409291
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    Cited by:

    1. Irina Peaucelle, 2002. "Santé et éducation dans les systèmes d'innovation du continent européen," Innovations, De Boeck Université, vol. 16(2), pages 125-144.

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