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De la théorie du dumping

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  • Patrick Messerlin

Abstract

[eng] About dumping theory. . Dumping does not seem to be satisfactorily analyzed by the traditional theory, which reduces it to a mere static process of price discrimination between home and foreign markets. This article suggests two results. First, if one sticks to the analysis of dumping as discrimination through prices, one can show that, if taken in a dynamic context, dumping can be analyzed according to a procedure which is quite in the same Une as that of the infant industry argument ; the prime result is that an anti-dumping policy proceeding from the country which is subjected to dumping can be optimum, on the same grounds that a protective policy of infant industry is ; this policy doesn't besides have to be carried out by the government, it seems, more generally, to result from a collective action of the firms which are concerned. But, and that is the second result, dumping is not only to be explained by differences between the home and foreign demands ; in a world which is not fully informed, it can be apprehended as a means to inform consumers about the relative qualifies of the products available to the firms. If this new way of under-standing dumping is agreed with, it can be shown that, on the one hand the firms which practice dumping cannot be held liable for the drop observed about prices, and on the other hand an anti-dumping policy carried out by a country whose firms resort to actions of dumping is not necessarily optimal. [fre] Le dumping ne paraît pas analysé de façon satisfaisante par la théorie tradition­nelle : celle-ci le réduit, en effet, à un simple processus statique de discrimina­tion par les prix entre les marchés intérieur et extérieurs. En prenant deux différentes approches, cet article offre deux résultats nouveaux :. . 1. .Si l'on s'en tient à une analyse du dumping en des termes exclusifs de discrimination par les prix, il peut être montré que, considéré dans un cadre dynamique, le dumping s'analyse selon une procédure tout à fait parallèle à celle de l'argument de l'industrie de l'enfance. Le résultat essentiel est qu'une politique anti-dumping émanant du pays soumis au dumping peut être optimale, au même titre qu'une politique de protection de l'industrie de l'enfance ; cette politique ne doit d'ailleurs pas nécessairement être menée par le gouvernement, mais paraît devoir être, le plus souvent, le fait d'une action collective des firmes concernées.. . 2.Mais le dumping n'est pas seulement explicable par des différences dans les demandes internes et externes ; dans un monde sous information incomplète, il peut s'apprécier comme un moyen d'information des consommateurs, sur les qualités relatives des produits, à la disposition des firmes. Si l'on accepte cette nouvelle façon d'interpréter le dumping, on peut démontrer d'une part que les firmes engageant le dumping ne peuvent être tenues pour responsables de la baisse des prix constatée, et d'autre part qu'une politique anti-dumping menée par le pays dont les firmes mettent en œuvre des actions de dumping n'est pas nécessairement optimale.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrick Messerlin, 1978. "De la théorie du dumping," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 29(5), pages 789-819.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1978_num_29_5_408416
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