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Les fonds de pension américains, le gouvernement d’entreprise et la durabilité

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  • Andrew Clearfield

Abstract

[eng] American Pension Funds, Corporate Governance and Sustainability.. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate a certain internal incoherence within the professional fund management industry, and in particular within the American pension funds. Following a discussion of the structure of the industry of pension fund management, and the special role of public pension funds particularly with respect to corporate governance and sustainability issues, a peculiar form of self-deception is demonstrated in the latter : their actions are often not in accordance with stated policies in this area. The author identifies two self-contradictory tendencies which dominate the current debate regarding corporate governance and the responsibility of investors, including the pension funds, for the current crisis. One, short-termism, is integral to the nature of savings and of the professional management of retirement monies for others. Whatever amelioration of this tendency is possible would have to come from outside the industry itself. The other, a prevalence of conflicts of interest particularly focused upon issues of investor involvement in the governance and sustainability of the business models of corporations, is a by-product of the current structure of the industry, and could be ameliorated by internal reforms initiated within the industry itself. . Classification JEL : G23, G24, G34. [fre] L’objectif de cet article est de montrer des incohérences internes au sein de l’industrie d’investissement professionnelle, et notamment dans les fonds de pension américains. Après une discussion à propos de la structure de l’industrie des fonds de pension, et en particulier du rôle des fonds de pension publics sur la gouvernance d’entreprise, l’article identifie une certaine auto déception dans ce rôle : les activités des fonds ne sont pas toujours en accord avec leurs politiques affichées en la matière. L’auteur discerne deux tendances contradictoires qui dominent le débat contemporain au sujet de la gouvernance d’entreprise et de la responsabilité des investisseurs, y compris des fonds de pension, dans la crise actuelle. La première tendance qui favorise le court terme fait partie intégrante de la nature de l’épargne et de la gestion professionnelle des fonds de retraite. Si une amélioration de cette tendance est possible, elle viendra probablement de l’extérieur. L’autre tendance est une prévalence des conflits d’intérêt particulièrement évidente en ce qui concerne les engagements des fonds dans la gouvernance et les questions de durabilité des sociétés de portefeuille. Ces conflits d’intérêts sont inhérents à la structure actuelle du secteur des fonds de pension, et la situation pourrait être améliorée par des réformes internes initiées par le secteur lui-même. . Classification JEL : G23, G24, G34.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrew Clearfield, 2012. "Les fonds de pension américains, le gouvernement d’entreprise et la durabilité," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 105(1), pages 205-230.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2012_num_105_1_5971
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    JEL classification:

    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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