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L’invention du régulateur bancaire dans les années 1930 aux États-Unis

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  • Dominique Lacoue-Labarthe

Abstract

[eng] Establishing the Banking Regulator in the United States 1930’s.. Some bank reforms of the thirties may have been overvalued. The Glass-Steagall Act creatednewendogenous risks implying possible systemic effects. Deposit insurance failed to address the main cause of banking panics, the prohibition of bank branching preventing diversification of idiosyncratic risks while reinforcing inefficient unit banks. Separation of commercial and investment banking avoided certain conflicts of interest at an opportunity cost associated with rejecting universal banking. Moreover, the regulator was captured by the regulated as it expressed a preference toward an aggressive participant in a duopolistic conflict. On the opposite, major innovations in bailout process and prudential regulation appeared underestimated. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation of 1932 established the investor of last resort giving the Treasury the authority to recapitalize an insolvent financial institution deemed too big to fail. The banking regulator, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation of 1933, was given a special bank-closure rule, different from the usual bankruptcy proceedings, which allowed for orderly resolution of failing banks with a view to protect the economy from systemic risk. . Classification JEL : G28, N12, N4. [fre] Certaines réformes bancaires des années 1930 aux États-Unis ont été surévaluées. Le populaire Glass-Steagall Act de 1933 crée en réalité de nouveaux risques endogènes de portée systémique. L’assurance-dépôt méconnaît la cause principale des paniques bancaires, l’interdiction des réseaux bancaires diversifiés géographiquement, et renforce au contraire la banque unitaire inefficace. La séparation de la banque commerciale et de la banque d’investissement met fin à certains conflits d’intérêts dans les banques, mais elle crée un coût d’opportunité en empêchant la banque universelle de se développer efficacement. Une intervention inopportune du régulateur dans un conflit de duopole bancaire le rend captif des régulés. En revanche, des innovations fondatrices majeures pour les sauvetages et la régulation prudentielle paraissent sous-estimées. La Reconstruction Finance Corporation de 1932 établit l’investisseur en dernier ressort qui permet au Trésor de recapitaliser une institution financière insolvable trop importante pour faire défaut. Le régulateur bancaire, la Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation de 1933, est doté d’une règle administrative spéciale de fermeture des banques, distincte de la loi de la faillite commerciale et de résolution ordonnée des défaillances pour empêcher la propagation du risque systémique. . Classification JEL : G28, N12, N4.

Suggested Citation

  • Dominique Lacoue-Labarthe, 2012. "L’invention du régulateur bancaire dans les années 1930 aux États-Unis," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 105(1), pages 71-102.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2012_num_105_1_5964
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • N12 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - U.S.; Canada: 1913-
    • N4 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • N12 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - U.S.; Canada: 1913-
    • N4 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation

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