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Contrat avec aversion pour le risque et partage des risques : une application à l'industrie spatiale

Listed author(s):
  • Françoise Bastié
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    [fre] Contrat avec aversion pour le risque et partage des risques : une application à l'industrie spatiale par Françoise Bastié Dans l'industrie spatiale française, les avenants aux contrats initiaux permettent de répartir le risque entre l'agence spatiale française et les industriels. Cet article étudie le partage du risque dans ce type de contrats. Dans le modèle, le principal (l'agence spatiale), neutre envers le risque, offre un contrat constitué de deux prix à un agent (l'industriel), averse au risque. Selon le prix choisi par ce dernier, le principal contrôle ou non le coût de l'industriel. Par conséquent, l'audit est sous le contrôle de l'agent. Sous cette hypothèse, le risque peut être entièrement supporté par l'une des deux parties au contrat ou bien partagé entre elles. Le résultat dépend du degré d'aversion pour le risque de l'agent et du coût de l'effort. Cette analyse théorique est suivie d'une étude économétrique dont l'objectif est d'estimer le paramètre de partage du risque dans les contrats agence spatiale-industriels. [eng] Contract with risk-aversion and risk-sharing: an application to the space industry by Françoise Fouquet-Bastié In the French space industry, annexes to the initial contracts provide for risk-sharing between the French space agency and industrial firms. This article examines the sharing of risk in this type of contract. In the model, the principal (the space agency), which is risk-neutral, proposes a contract comprising two prices to an agent (the industrialist) who is risk-averse. Depending on the price chosen by the latter, the principal will or will not audit the industrialist's costs. As a consequence, the audit is in the control of the agent. On this assumption, the risk can either be entirely borne by one of the two parties to the contract or shared between them. The result depends on the agent's degree of risk-aversion and the cost of the effort made. This theoretical analysis is followed by an econometric study aimed at estimating the risk-sharing parameter in contracts between the space agency and industrial firms.

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    Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Économie & prévision.

    Volume (Year): 145 (2000)
    Issue (Month): 4 ()
    Pages: 83-96

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    Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_2000_num_145_4_6114
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.2000.6114
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