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Régulation de firmes polluantes en libre-échange : conséquences des asymétries d'information et des groupes de pression

Listed author(s):
  • Marie-Françoise Calmette

[eng] Regulation of Polluting Firms in the free Market: Consequences of Asymmetric Information and Pressure Groups by Marie-Françoise Calmette Our object is to analyse the consequences of opening up the borders between two regulated polluting monopolies in the absence of any strategic environment policy. The main question is whether the free market allows a satisfactory reallocation of global output from the most polluting country to the least polluting country or whether, on the contrary, the "size effect" is confirmed. We then assume asymmetric information in each country between the firm and the agency, and we study the effects of this asymmetry on pollution levels. Finally, we bring in the role of pressure groups by supposing that regulation is performed not by a benevolent agency but by a majority representing the interests of certain economic agents. [fre] Notre but est d'analyser les conséquences de l'ouverture des frontières entre deux monopoles polluants régulés, en l'absence de toute politique environnementale stratégique. La première question posée est de savoir si le libre échange permet une bonne réallocation de la production mondiale du pays le plus polluant vers le pays le moins polluant ou au contraire si " l'effet de taille " se vérifie. Puis nous supposons une asymétrie d'information dans chaque pays entre la firme et l'agence et étudions les conséquences de ces asymétries sur les niveaux de pollution. Enfin, nous introduisons le rôle des groupes de pression en supposant que la régulation n'est plus faite par une agence bienveillante mais par une majorité représentant les intérêts de certains agents.

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Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Économie & prévision.

Volume (Year): 143 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 101-116

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Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_2000_num_143_2_6009
Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.2000.6009
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