Corporate governance and residual state property (two qualitative shortcomings of privatization in transition countries)
The privatization in transition countries generated distorsions. Among the most dangerous distorsions are those introduced by a non legal or criminal privatization of management with the help of former or new informal networks connecting managers to the irregular economy and to some extent to the mafia. State regulation is required to control again monopoly power in privatized utilities and sectors where private stakes have won privileged position. It should be better to recognize the unavoidable role of the state in economic restructuring and use its intervention as a complementary - rather than an antagonistic - tool of the economic transition.
Volume (Year): 2000 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: nam. W. Churchilla 4, 130 67 Praha 3|
Phone: (02) 24 09 51 11
Fax: (02) 24 22 06 57
Web page: http://www.vse.cz/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Postal: Editorial office Prague Economic Papers, University of Economics, nám. W. Churchilla 4, 130 67 Praha 3, Czech Republic|
Web: http://www.vse.cz/pep/ Email:
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prg:jnlpep:v:2000:y:2000:i:1:id:61. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Frantisek Sokolovsky)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.