K pojmu "přirozeného zákona" (bytí lidsky jsoucího) v Hobbesově filosofii

This study ("On the concept of natural law - of human being - in Hobbes´ philosophy") is an appendix to my studies on development of the concept of law (of being) in classical modern philosophy. What is the position of natural law (of human being) in Hobbes´ philosophy in development of the concept of law (of being) in classical modern philosophy? If Hobbes´ concept of natural law (of human being) is a concept of moral law (of human being) as Hobbes himself declares does it mean that Hobbes´ concept of natural law (of human being) anticipates e. g. Kant´s concept of moral law (of human being)? There is defined Hobbes´ concept of natural law (of human being) in this study, namely by demonstration of Hobbes´ conception of essential source, (essential) contents, (essential) form, and validity (liability) of natural law (of human being). Natural law (of human being) according to Hobbes may be formulated by the following way: Act in such a way so that you can always keep both your own life and life of other people. As far as to keep both one´s own life and life of other people presupposes to keep peace among people (in human society) if it is possible, and if it is not possible to keep peace among people (in human society) it pressuposes to search for allies for fight angainst enemies, thus far natural law (of human being) according to Hobbes may be formulated by the following way, too: If it is possible act in such a way so that you can always keep peace among people (in human society); if it is not possible to keep peace among people (in human society) search allies for fight against enemies. There is defined Hobbes´ concept of positive civil law (of human being in state and legal social form) in this study, too, namely by demonstration of Hobbes´ conception of essential source, (essential) contents, (essential) form, and validity (liability) of positive civil law (of human being in state and legal social form), as well as of his conception of relation between natural law (of human being) and positive civil law (of human being in state and legal social form). Furthermore, Hobbes´ concept of natural law (of human being) as well as Hobbes´ concept of positive civil law (of human being in state and legal social form) and his conception of relation between natural law (of human being) and positive civil law (of human being in state and legal social form) are scarified. The main points of their scarifiing are as follows: 1. Hobbes´ concept of natural law (of human being) is different from any concept of moral law (of human being) because of not being based on reason of ethical and practical type and (therefore) not having any form of categorical imperativ; it has a form of hypothetical imperativ and it is based on reason of vital and practical type: it means that Hobbes´ concept of natural law (of human being) must be different from any concept of moral law (of human being). (To save always human life is not always the same as to serve always to human being.) 2. Furthermore, natural law (of human being) according to Hobbes is representated by positive civil law (of human being in state and legal social form); however, being representated is here (according to Hobbes) the same as being eliminated: the man as a citizen of state (Commonwealth) is owed only to positive civil laws (of human being in state and legal social form); it means that the man as a citizen of state (Commonwealth) is not (any longer) owed to natural law (of human being) which was eliminated in legal and state form of human society (in human society with the form of state and legality - i.e. of Commonwealth). Hence it follows: if Hobbes´ concept of natural law (of human being) is different from any concept of moral law (of human being) in spite of what Hobbes himself declares then Hobbes´ concept of natural law (of human being) can not anticipace not even Kant´s concept of moral law (of human being). After all hence it follows: this study ("On the concept of natural law - of human being - in Hobbes´ philosophy") which is an appendix to my studies on development of the concept of law (of beeing) in classical modern philosophy shows and proves that the position of natural law (of human being) in Hobbes´ philosophy in develepment of the concept of law (of being) in classical modern philosophy is a position of a concept of law of nature (concerning human being) among other concepts of laws of nature (concerning products of nature); it means that the difference of that concept of law of nature (concerning human being) among other concepts of laws of nature (concerning products of nature) is a diference of their sphere of being: its sphere of being is neither the "world of nature" as such nor the "world of freedom" as such but human natural world as the world of human nature.