On Sartres Ontology and Metaphysics
Sartre's ontology is not only self-contradictory in many respects but also heavily burdened by the heritage of Aristotelian and Cartesian metaphysics. This results in the principal incompatibility of Sartre's allegedly phenomenological analyses of the relations between �tre pour soi and �tre en soi with the advancements of modern evolutionary and self-organisation theories. Being under a massive influence of Cartesian constructivist rationalism, Sartre fails to present an adequate phenomenolgical description of human emotions, too; this failure becomes explicit especially in comparison with Hume's and Smith's theory of moral sentiments and with Brentano's descriptive psychology.
Volume (Year): 2005 (2005)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
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