IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/plo/pone00/0340063.html

The impact of tournament incentives on corporate credit repair: Evidence from China

Author

Listed:
  • Jianxiu Wang
  • Yuntian You
  • Yuanxiang Dong
  • Rongwang Guo

Abstract

This study investigates the impact of tournament incentives on corporate credit repair and re-repair. Drawing on tournament and agency theory, respectively, we argue that tournament incentives improve corporate credit repair and re-repair by motivating non-CEO executives' effort and risk-taking, and by inducing incumbent CEOs to supervise subordinates to restrain opportunistic behavior. Using data from Chinese listed companies from 2009 to 2023 and employing SHAP values and benchmark traditional econometric methods, our results show that tournament incentives have a positive impact on corporate credit repair and re-repair. Furthermore, CEO shareholding strengthens the positive impact of tournament incentives on corporate credit repair, whereas firm age weakens the positive impact of tournament incentives on corporate credit repair. Additionally, firm size and leverage weaken the positive impact of tournament incentives on corporate credit re-repair. This paper sheds light on the role of tournament incentives on corporate executives for policymakers to enhance corporate credit repair.

Suggested Citation

  • Jianxiu Wang & Yuntian You & Yuanxiang Dong & Rongwang Guo, 2026. "The impact of tournament incentives on corporate credit repair: Evidence from China," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 21(1), pages 1-25, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0340063
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0340063
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0340063
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0340063&type=printable
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1371/journal.pone.0340063?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Haß, Lars Helge & Müller, Maximilian A. & Vergauwe, Skrålan, 2015. "Tournament incentives and corporate fraud," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 251-267.
    2. Martin J. Conyon & Lerong He, 2016. "Executive Compensation and Corporate Fraud in China," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 134(4), pages 669-691, April.
    3. Karpoff, Jonathan M. & Lee, D. Scott & Martin, Gerald S., 2008. "The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 43(3), pages 581-611, September.
    4. Zhong, Xi & Ren, Liuyang & Song, Tiebo, 2021. "Different effects of internal and external tournament incentives on corporate financial misconduct: Evidence from China," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 329-341.
    5. Jared Harris & Philip Bromiley, 2007. "Incentives to Cheat: The Influence of Executive Compensation and Firm Performance on Financial Misrepresentation," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(3), pages 350-367, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ziwei Wang & Chunfeng Wang & Zhenming Fang, 2023. "Common institutional ownership and corporate misconduct," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 44(1), pages 102-136, January.
    2. Xi Zhong & Liuyang Ren & Tiebo Song, 2023. "To cheat when continuously missing aspirations: Does CEO experience matter?," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 815-845, June.
    3. Wu, Fang & Cao, June & Zhang, Xiaosan, 2023. "Do non-executive employees matter in curbing corporate financial fraud?," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 163(C).
    4. Wang Dong & Yuan Meng & Jun Chen & Yun Ke, 2025. "Financial Shared Service Centers and Corporate Misconduct: Evidence from China," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 199(1), pages 113-139, June.
    5. Liuyang Ren & Xi Zhong & Liangyong Wan, 2022. "Missing Analyst Forecasts and Corporate Fraud: Evidence from China," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 181(1), pages 171-194, November.
    6. Yu, Wei & Yan, Yueyun & Zhu, Keying & Zhang, Peijue, 2024. "Can value-added tax refund policy inhibit corporate financial fraud? Evidence from China," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    7. Ziwei Wang & Chunfeng Wang & Zhenming Fang, 2024. "Learning from Failures of Co-owned Firms: Common Ownership and Information Disclosure Fraud," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 195(1), pages 95-119, November.
    8. Wang, Ziwei & Yao, Shouyu & Sensoy, Ahmet & Goodell, John W. & Cheng, Feiyang, 2022. "Learning from failures: Director interlocks and corporate misconduct," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
    9. Zhong, Xi & Ren, Liuyang & Song, Tiebo, 2021. "Different effects of internal and external tournament incentives on corporate financial misconduct: Evidence from China," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 329-341.
    10. Zhou, Jian & Lei, Xiaodong, 2025. "ESG rating uncertainty and corporate financial misconduct," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
    11. Abdul Ghafoor & Rozaimah Zainudin & Nurul Shahnaz Mahdzan, 2019. "Factors Eliciting Corporate Fraud in Emerging Markets: Case of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions in Malaysia," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 160(2), pages 587-608, December.
    12. Hailiang Zou & Yunfeng Lu & Guoyou Qi, 2023. "Does Pay Disparity within Top Management Teams Lead to Bribery Activity? The Moderation of Demographic Diversity," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(4), pages 1-23, February.
    13. Shan Xue & Yi Tang & Yuehua Xu & Chu-Ding Ling & Xiao-Yun Xie & Shenjiang Mo, 2024. "How boards’ factional faultlines affect corporate financial fraud," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 351-376, March.
    14. Monica Ramos Montesdeoca & Agustín J. Sánchez Medina & Felix Blázquez Santana, 2019. "Research Topics in Accounting Fraud in the 21st Century: A State of the Art," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(6), pages 1-31, March.
    15. Bryan, David B. & Mason, Terry W., 2017. "Executive tournament incentives and audit fees," Advances in accounting, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 30-45.
    16. Dan Amiram & Zahn Bozanic & James D. Cox & Quentin Dupont & Jonathan M. Karpoff & Richard Sloan, 2018. "Financial reporting fraud and other forms of misconduct: a multidisciplinary review of the literature," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 732-783, June.
    17. Yener Altunbaş & John Thornton & Yurtsev Uymaz, 2021. "Money laundering and bank risk: Evidence from U.S. banks," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(4), pages 4879-4894, October.
    18. David Gomulya & Warren Boeker, 2016. "Reassessing board member allegiance: CEO replacement following financial misconduct," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(9), pages 1898-1918, September.
    19. Melanie Millar & Roger M. White & Xin Zheng, 2023. "Substance Abuse and Workplace Fraud: Evidence from Physicians," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 183(2), pages 585-602, March.
    20. Achakzai, Muhammad Atif Khan & Peng, Juan, 2023. "Detecting financial statement fraud using dynamic ensemble machine learning," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0340063. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: plosone (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.