Government regulation or market mechanism? A study on the collaborative innovation pathways of the emergency industry based on evolutionary game models

Promoting collaborative innovation within the emergency industry has become a crucial task, which is of great significance for enhancing emergency response capabilities and ensuring public safety. On the basis of considering the economic attributes of the emergency industry and the uncertainty characteristics of market returns, this study constructs an evolutionary game model for collaborative innovation among emergency enterprises, universities and research institutions (UR), and government departments, which are the main entities considered. It analyzes the evolutionary process of the strategy choices and equilibrium states of different entities, thereby revealing the key factors and intrinsic mechanisms affecting collaborative innovation pathways. The study results indicate that the economic attributes of the emergency industry and the uncertainty of market returns are key factors that constrain the collaborative innovation and development of the emergency industry. The economic attributes of the emergency industry determine the applicable boundaries of government regulation and market mechanisms in the collaborative innovation process of the emergency industry. Due to the “marketization paradox” in the emergency industry with weak economic attributes, and the fact that emergency enterprises and UR are more likely to face the “prisoner’s dilemma” in the process of collaborative innovation, collaborative innovation via the government regulation-driven pathway is more feasible; In contrast, for the emergency industry with strong economic attributes, the government can effectively strengthen the market-oriented profit mechanism by enhancing public safety emergency awareness, thereby promoting collaborative innovation driven by market mechanisms in the emergency industry. Based on the analysis of the effects of different regulatory measures, it is found that government procurement is more effective than R&D subsidy policy. R&D subsidies are not only ineffective in avoiding the “prisoner’s dilemma” in the collaborative innovation process, but also have a “double-edged sword” effect. Excessive subsidy intensity can actually inhibit the enthusiasm of emergency enterprises and UR for collaborative innovation. When government departments adopt regulatory actions, focusing on balancing incentive and punitive measures, and emergency enterprises and UR focus on establishing a reasonable benefit distribution mechanism, which can more effectively improve the efficiency of collaborative innovation and form a good situation of win-win for all parties. The above findings provide certain decision-making references for the promotion of innovative development in the emergency industry.