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Relational Diversity Promotes Cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma Games

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  • Bo Xu
  • Jianwei Wang
  • Ruipu Deng
  • Miao Li

Abstract

Relational diversity can be characterized by heterogeneous distributions of tie strengths in social networks and this diversity is present not only among humans, but throughout the animal world. We account for this observation by analyzing two network datasets from Facebook. We measure the strength of a tie by calculating the extent of overlap of friends between the two individuals. Based on the previous findings in human experiments, we argue that it is very unlikely that players will allocate their investments equally to their neighbors. There is a tendency that players prefer to donate more to their intimate friends. We find that if players preferentially allocate their investments to their good friends, cooperation will be promoted in PDG. We proved that the facilitation of the cooperative strategy relies mostly on the cooperative allies between best friends, resulting in the formation of cooperative clusters which are able to prevail against the defectors even when there is a large cost to cooperate. Moreover, we discover that the effect of relational diversity cannot be analyzed by adopting classical complex networks models, because neither of the artificial networks is able to produce networks with diverse distributions of tie strengths. It is of vital importance to introduce real social networks to study the influence of diverse relations especially when it comes to humans. This research proposes a brand new perspective to understand the influence of social relations on the emergence of cooperation in evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games.

Suggested Citation

  • Bo Xu & Jianwei Wang & Ruipu Deng & Miao Li, 2014. "Relational Diversity Promotes Cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma Games," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 9(12), pages 1-14, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0114464
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0114464
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    Cited by:

    1. Wu, Yu’e & Zhang, Zhipeng & Chang, Shuhua, 2019. "Reciprocal reward promotes the evolution of cooperation in structured populations," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 230-236.

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