Tax Amnesties and Tax Evasion Inertia
We present a model of tax evasion with a two-period tax liability, in which the administration is unable to commit to any inspection policy. In equilibrium, the probability of an inspection is increasing in the divergence between the present income report and that of last period.
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Volume (Year): 51 (1996)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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