IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Market Vote Trading and Efficient Public Choice

Listed author(s):
  • Hewitt, Daniel P
Registered author(s):

    Market vote trading, where consumers directly substitute private goods for political influence, is examined to determine if this institutional modification can circumvent the vote paradox. The trading proves to have the potential to enhance the efficiency of democratic public choice for two reasons. It allows citizens to influence the vote outcome according to the intensity of their demands and citizen behavior in the market for votes provides information to government on demand for public services. The findings, which might have implications for the regulation of lobbies and PACs, are only valid when dealing with allocation decisions rather than distributional choices.

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Article provided by in its journal Public Finance = Finances publiques.

    Volume (Year): 42 (1987)
    Issue (Month): 1 ()
    Pages: 85-104

    as
    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:pfi:pubfin:v:42:y:1987:i:1:p:85-104
    Contact details of provider:

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pfi:pubfin:v:42:y:1987:i:1:p:85-104. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.