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Enhancing environmental sustainability of infrastructure projects through a novel dynamic evolutionary model: a rational whistleblower perspective

Author

Listed:
  • Yingxia Xue

    (Southwest University)

  • Guangbin Wang

    (Tongji University)

  • Zhiqiang Wu

    (Tongji University)

  • Wensheng Lin

    (Tongji University)

Abstract

Environmental sustainability has garnered significant public attention and has become crucial to infrastructure project success. The exposure of whistleblowers on social media often elicits a widespread social response. However, prior research failed to connect the environmental sustainability of infrastructure projects with whistleblowers. This paper aims to fill the gap by constructing a tripartite game model to study the evolving environmental sustainability in infrastructure projects from the perspective of a rational whistleblower. The model involves the government, the private sector, and the rational whistleblower. A numerical simulation is conducted to analyze the impact of important factors on the dynamic evolution of different parties. The research findings include the following. (i) The dynamic evolution of strategy adoption in the private sector is closely intertwined with that of the government and whistleblowers. (ii) High supervision costs and losses incurred from whistleblowing may diminish whistleblowers’ willingness to monitor environmental issues. Governments need to adopt technical measures and formulate corresponding policies to safeguard whistleblowers’ privacy security and personal safety. (iii) Rewards, governmental efficiency, and indirect income can enhance rational whistleblowers’ enthusiasm for participating in environmental supervision of infrastructure projects. Joint efforts from governments and society are required to cultivate a favorable environment for whistleblowers. (iv) Adopting cost-effective new technologies can improve the efficiency of governments, the private sector, and whistleblowers. Enhanced research and development investment and attention to the distinctive features of different technologies are warranted. Finally, several recommendations are proposed to enhance the environmental sustainability of infrastructure projects.

Suggested Citation

  • Yingxia Xue & Guangbin Wang & Zhiqiang Wu & Wensheng Lin, 2025. "Enhancing environmental sustainability of infrastructure projects through a novel dynamic evolutionary model: a rational whistleblower perspective," Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 12(1), pages 1-14, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:palcom:v:12:y:2025:i:1:d:10.1057_s41599-025-05480-w
    DOI: 10.1057/s41599-025-05480-w
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    References listed on IDEAS

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