IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/pal/palcom/v12y2025i1d10.1057_s41599-025-05329-2.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Evolutionary game analysis of Arctic shipping black carbon emission reduction strategies based on government regulation and port fee differential policies

Author

Listed:
  • Xinli Qi

    (Dalian Maritime University)

  • Zhenfu Li

    (Dalian Maritime University)

  • Yiran Zhang

    (Dalian Maritime University)

  • Qiqi Zhang

    (Dalian Maritime University)

  • Chunrui Song

    (Dalian Maritime University)

Abstract

The issue of black carbon (BC) emissions from Arctic shipping has garnered significant attention from the international community. Promoting action among key stakeholders is particularly critical at this juncture. This study constructed a BC emissions governance model for Arctic shipping based on government regulation and differential port fee policies, and established an evolutionary game model of Arctic coastal governments, ports and shipping companies, analyzing the impact of evolutionary steady state and various parameter variables on the choice of stakeholder behavioral strategies. The results show that $${E}_{8}(\mathrm{1,1,1})$$ E 8 ( 1,1,1 ) is the optimal steady-state case for the system, which means active government regulation along the Arctic, implementation of port fee differential policies by port, and active emission reductions by shipping companies. During the game process, each participant’s strategy is influenced by the initial choices made by other participants. Among them, the coastal government’s first supervision is the key factor in promoting the emission reduction behavior of the shipping industry. At the same time, appropriate coastal government reward and punishment mechanisms and differential port fee policies play a decisive role in emission control. If the policy intensity is too low, shipping companies may lack action for a long time. Excessive policy intensity may affect the long-term sustainability of the policy. In addition, lower emission reduction technology costs help to enhance the willingness of shipping companies to reduce emissions. On the contrary, high technology costs will weaken their enthusiasm and may cause the government to turn to passive regulation due to regulatory costs and delayed market response. Overall, to achieve the desired stabilization strategy for BC emission reductions in Arctic shipping, collective action is essential.

Suggested Citation

  • Xinli Qi & Zhenfu Li & Yiran Zhang & Qiqi Zhang & Chunrui Song, 2025. "Evolutionary game analysis of Arctic shipping black carbon emission reduction strategies based on government regulation and port fee differential policies," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 12(1), pages 1-18, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:pal:palcom:v:12:y:2025:i:1:d:10.1057_s41599-025-05329-2
    DOI: 10.1057/s41599-025-05329-2
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1057/s41599-025-05329-2
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1057/s41599-025-05329-2?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pal:palcom:v:12:y:2025:i:1:d:10.1057_s41599-025-05329-2. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.nature.com/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.