Kamaraj plan: a perspective from Kashmir

The nature of politics in Jammu & Kashmir, post-1947, primarily draws its character from three key events. The dismissal of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah in 1953 was the first one, and the launch of Muslim Mutahida Mahaz, an amalgamation of different pro-freedom factions in 1987 was the second. The third one, which forms the moot of this study, the failure of the Kamaraj Plan in 1963, had all it was needed to stimulate the shift in the movement of ‘Self-determination’. It severely cut the movement from its hitherto structural apparatus and allowed new groups to lead the movement. Because of reasons contested, the first two events garnered substantial attention from scholars and political scientists; however the Kamaraj Plan, because it had to witness failure in its designs, had to suffer negligence. It is to fill this gap, the present study aims to probe into the socio-political history of Jammu and Kashmir, arguing that the crisis ignited by Hazratbal relic theft had strong roots in the failure of this plan, with codifying religion in the very bracket of the Kashmir imbroglio. The paper employs Historical institutionalism’s concept of exogenous shocks and policy changes in the system and presents Kamaraj Plan as a ‘Critical Juncture’, which shifted the politics in Jammu and Kashmir in a particular direction.