A European Nuclear Accident Pool*
The compensation to victims of nuclear accidents is based on a Paris (OECD) and a Vienna (UN) convention. A problem with the system is that a strictly liable, but insolvent or uninsured plant owner leaves victims without compensation. In this paper, it is argued that a system could be better organised by, for example, the European Union (EU). A State that permits a nuclear reactor on its territory should be strictly liable. Benefits are: (i) States are able to compensate large damages; (ii) theory suggests that stepwise modified risk-sharing could be made beneficial for risk-averse States; (iii) the EU can enforce sharing agreements by Member States; (iv) a State can limit its financial burden by redressing some liability to the domestic nuclear industry. The incentive created hereby, as well as regulations on location and safety may prevent accidents. A European nuclear accident pool will have a collective interest in accident prevention. The Geneva Papers (2008) 33, 274–287. doi:10.1057/gpp.2008.8
Volume (Year): 33 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ |
|Order Information:|| Postal: Palgrave Macmillan Journals, Subscription Department, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, UK|
Web: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/pal/subscribe/index.html Email:
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pal:gpprii:v:33:y:2008:i:2:p:274-287. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Daniel Foley)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.