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Shareholder Wealth Consequences of Insider Pledging of Company Stock as Collateral for Personal Loans

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  • Ying Dou
  • Ronald W Masulis
  • Jason Zein

Abstract

We study a widespread yet under-explored corporate governance phenomenon: the pledging of company stock by insiders as collateral for personal bank loans. Utilizing a regulatory change that exogenously decreases pledging, we document a negative causal impact of pledging on shareholder wealth. We study two channels that could explain this effect. First, we find that margin calls triggered by severe price falls exacerbate the crash risk of pledging firms. Second, since margin calls may cause insiders to suffer personal liquidity shocks or to forgo private benefits of control, we hypothesize and find that pledging is associated with reduced firm risk-taking.Received March 2, 2017; editorial decision January 24, 2019 by Editor David Denis. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Suggested Citation

  • Ying Dou & Ronald W Masulis & Jason Zein, 2019. "Shareholder Wealth Consequences of Insider Pledging of Company Stock as Collateral for Personal Loans," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 32(12), pages 4810-4854.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:32:y:2019:i:12:p:4810-4854.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhz034
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