IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/rfinst/v31y2018i6p2377-2414..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

When Transparency Improves, Must Prices Reflect Fundamentals Better?

Author

Listed:
  • Snehal Banerjee
  • Jesse Davis
  • Naveen Gondhi

Abstract

No. In the presence of speculative opportunities, investors can learn about both asset fundamentals and the beliefs of other traders. We show that this learning exhibits complementarity: learning more along one dimension increases the value of learning about the other. As a result, regulatory changes may be counterproductive. First, increasing transparency (i.e., making fundamental information cheaper to acquire) can make prices less informative when investors respond by learning relatively more about others. Second, public disclosures discourage private learning about fundamentals, while encouraging information acquisition about others. Accordingly, disclosing more fundamental information can decrease overall informational efficiency by decreasing price informativeness. Received April 20, 2016; editorial decision September 30, 2017 by Editor Itay Goldstein.

Suggested Citation

  • Snehal Banerjee & Jesse Davis & Naveen Gondhi, 2018. "When Transparency Improves, Must Prices Reflect Fundamentals Better?," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 31(6), pages 2377-2414.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:31:y:2018:i:6:p:2377-2414.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhy034
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Cookson, J. Anthony & Engelberg, Joseph E. & Mullins, William, 2020. "Echo Chambers," SocArXiv n2q9h, Center for Open Science.
    2. Goldstein, Itay & Yang, Liyan, 2019. "Good disclosure, bad disclosure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 118-138.
    3. Ferracuti, Elia & Stubben, Stephen R., 2019. "The role of financial reporting in resolving uncertainty about corporate investment opportunities," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(2).
    4. Anselmi, Giulio & Petrella, Giovanni, 2021. "Regulation and stock market quality: The impact of MiFID II provision on research unbundling," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    5. Ji, Yucheng & Xu, Weijun & Zhao, Qi & Jia, Zecheng, 2023. "ESG disclosure and investor welfare under asymmetric information and imperfect competition," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    6. Ljungqvist, Alexander & Chang, Yen-Cheng & Tseng, Kevin, 2020. "Do corporate disclosures constrain strategic analyst behavior?," CEPR Discussion Papers 14678, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Pintér, Gábor & Wang, Chaojun & Zou, Junyuan, 2022. "Information chasing versus adverse selection," Bank of England working papers 971, Bank of England.
    8. Jan Schneemeier, 2019. "Shock Propagation Through Cross-Learning in Opaque Networks," 2019 Meeting Papers 329, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    9. Xiong, Yan & Yang, Liyan, 2021. "Disclosure, competition, and learning from asset prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    10. Aghanya, Daniel & Agarwal, Vineet & Poshakwale, Sunil, 2020. "Market in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), stock price informativeness and liquidity," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
    11. Oh, Sebeom, 2023. "Market Manipulation in NFT Markets," MPRA Paper 116704, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Goldman, Eitan & Martel, Jordan & Schneemeier, Jan, 2022. "A theory of financial media," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 239-258.
    13. Glebkin, Sergei & Kuong, John Chi-Fong, 2023. "When large traders create noise," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(2).
    14. Jianghua Shen & Lingmin Xie & Zhimin Xie, 2022. "The unintended consequence of financial statement comparability: evidence from managerial learning practices," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 62(3), pages 3073-3106, September.
    15. Katharina Hombach & Thorsten Sellhorn, 2019. "Shaping Corporate Actions Through Targeted Transparency Regulation: A Framework and Review of Extant Evidence," Schmalenbach Business Review, Springer;Schmalenbach-Gesellschaft, vol. 71(2), pages 137-168, May.
    16. Nihad Aliyev, 2019. "Financial Markets with Multidimensional Uncertainty," PhD Thesis, Finance Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney, number 2-2019.
    17. Gondhi, Naveen, 2023. "Rational inattention, misallocation, and the aggregate economy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 50-75.
    18. Elena IONASCU & Marilena MIRONIUC & Ion ANGHEL, 2019. "Transparency of Real Estate Markets: Conceptual and Empirical Evidence," The Audit Financiar journal, Chamber of Financial Auditors of Romania, vol. 17(154), pages 306-306.
    19. Shiyang Huang & Bart Zhou Yueshen, 2021. "Speed Acquisition," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(6), pages 3492-3518, June.
    20. Liu, Xia & Liu, Shancun & Qi, Zhen & Wen, Chunhui, 2020. "Discretionary liquidity trading, information production and market efficiency," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 35(C).
    21. Abedifar, Pejman & Bouslah, Kais & Zheng, Yeliangzi, 2021. "Stock price synchronicity and price informativeness: Evidence from a regulatory change in the U.S. banking industry," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 40(C).
    22. Kang, Junqing & Lin, Shen & Xiong, Xiong, 2022. "What drives intraday reversal? illiquidity or liquidity oversupply?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 136(C).
    23. Campbell, Brett & Drake, Michael & Thornock, Jacob & Twedt, Brady, 2023. "Earnings Virality," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(1).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:31:y:2018:i:6:p:2377-2414.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/sfsssea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.