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Executive Compensation and the Role for Corporate Governance Regulation

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  • David L. Dicks

Abstract

This article establishes a role for corporate governance regulation. An externality operating through executive compensation motivates regulation. Governance lowers agency costs, allowing firms to grant less incentive pay. When a firm increases governance and lowers incentive pay, other firms can also lower executive compensation. Because firms do not internalize the full benefit of governance, regulation can improve investor welfare. When regulation is enforced, large firms increase in value, small firms decrease in value, and all firms lower incentive pay. Distinct cross-sectional and cross-country predictions for the number of voluntary governance firms are provided. The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • David L. Dicks, 2012. "Executive Compensation and the Role for Corporate Governance Regulation," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 25(6), pages 1971-2004.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:25:y:2012:i:6:p:1971-2004
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhs055
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Rui Albuquerque & Luis Brandao-Marques & Miguel A. Ferreira & Pedro Matos, 2013. "International Corporate Governance Spillovers; Evidence from Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions," IMF Working Papers 13/234, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Hege, Ulrich & Hutson, Elaine & Laing, Elaine, 2018. "The impact of mandatory governance changes on financial risk management," TSE Working Papers 18-889, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    3. Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet, "undated". "The structure of CEO pay: pay-for-luck and stock-options," FMG Discussion Papers dp713, Financial Markets Group.
    4. Fang, Yiwei & Hasan, Iftekhar & Li, Lingxiang, 2014. "Banking reform, risk-taking, and earnings quality – Evidence from transition countries," BOFIT Discussion Papers 19/2014, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
    5. Chen, I-Ju, 2014. "Financial crisis and the dynamics of corporate governance: Evidence from Taiwan's listed firms," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 3-28.
    6. Croci, Ettore & Petmezas, Dimitris, 2015. "Do risk-taking incentives induce CEOs to invest? Evidence from acquisitions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 1-23.
    7. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2016. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1232-1287, December.
    8. Gayle, George-Levi & Golan, Limor & Miller, Robert A., 2015. "Interlocked Executives and Insider Board Members: An Empirical Analysis," Working Papers 2015-40, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    9. Campbell, T. Colin & Thompson, Mary Elizabeth, 2015. "Why are CEOs paid for good luck? An empirical comparison of explanations for pay-for-luck asymmetry," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 247-264.
    10. Hoffmann, Florian & Inderst, Roman & Opp, Marcus, 2014. "Regulating Deferred Incentive Pay," CEPR Discussion Papers 9877, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. repec:eee:jaecon:v:64:y:2017:i:1:p:1-14 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Kalodimos, Jonathan, 2017. "Internal governance and performance: Evidence from when external discipline is weak," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 193-216.
    13. repec:hrv:faseco:34651704 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. repec:spr:jecfin:v:42:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s12197-016-9383-5 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. repec:eee:eecrev:v:102:y:2018:i:c:p:39-61 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2014. "Explaining the Association between Monitoring and Controversial CEO Pay Practices: an Optimal Contracting Perspective," Cahiers de recherche 1406, CIRPEE.

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